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The ‘Righteous Anger’ of the Powerless
Investigating Dalit Outrage over Caste
Violence
Nicolas Jaoul
 
Introduction1
1 In  November  2006,  the  Maharashtrian  Buddhist  community2 revolted  against  the
massacre of four members of a family by the dominant castes in Khairlanji village of the
Vidarbha region (Eastern Maharashtra),  more exactly against  the inaction or  alleged
compliance  of  the  local  administration.  The  massacre  highlighted  the  enormous
difference between the notion of a democratic society and the actual suppression of poor
and marginalised Dalits (‘untouchables’). Official neglect of Dalits, as well as the routine
failure to apply the specific law meant to prevent Dalit atrocities, makes possible the
occurrence of  such atrocities in broad daylight.  As is  generally the case with violent
attacks on rural Dalits, the murderers not only wanted to teach assertive Dalits a lesson,
but also to flaunt how openly they could afford to do it. In other words, this was a public
statement by dominant castes that their caste rule was above and beyond the law, a
public demonstration that a conspicuous violation of the law on such a scale could indeed
be protected by putative law enforcers. The astonishing level of cruelty displayed in the
collective attack against helpless victims, as well as local authorities’ disturbing apathy,
which revealed the depth of the institutionalisation of caste prejudice, generated anguish
and  distress  in  the  assertive  Buddhist  community,  nourishing  fears  of  practical
disenfranchisement  and  further  victimisation.  This  paper  will  analyse  the  way  the
discrepancy between the law and its enactment was challenged by them, through the
public staging of anger and moral outrage.
2 In the violent protests that followed about a month after the massacre, the protestors
braved interdictions and confronted the Police. They most consistently assumed the
The ‘Righteous Anger’ of the PowerlessInvestigating Dalit Outrage over Caste ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
1
stance of the ‘outraged community’  standing up dramatically,  shunning ‘compromise’
and ‘politics’,  conspicuously resorting to violence, and lyrically claiming the values of
heroic  resistance  in  the  face  of  state  repression.  Although  Dalit  protests  have  been
regularly held in the aftermath of caste atrocities, it was the first time in history that
Dalits gave voice to their feelings of injustice on such a scale.
3 A year and a half after the uprising that shook the Vidarbha region (and that spread even
more violently to the rest of Maharashtra in the immediate aftermath), I visited Nagpur
city  and the neighbouring Bhandara district,  where Khairlanji  is  situated.  I  gathered
documentation from the movement (pamphlets and leaflets circulated during protests, as
well  as  a  sympathetic  documentary  movie  that  was  shot  during  the  protests)  and
collected some local organisers and ordinary protestors’ oral testimonies. Drawing on this
material,  my  paper  analyses  the  popular  language  of  outrage  that  unfolded  in  this
collective act of human rights vigilance, and questions the popular understandings of
what was at stake in this passionate reaction.
4 The workings  of  this  moral  crusade of  the  oppressed provide  an interesting case  of
E.P. Thompson’s reflection on the subaltern uses of moral precepts during the English
eighteenth century’s food riots.  Moral economy, a morally sanctioned and consensual
economy of subsistence, was invoked by plebeians in their opposition to emerging rural
capitalism. Thompson shows that the defence of established morality by the very people
whose social and political subjection it also entailed in normal times, suddenly became
connoted by rebellion and the insurgents’ emotional fervour. The defence of morality was
thus intimately linked to the crystallisation and public expression of a subaltern agency
that invoked:
(…) passionately held notions of the common weal – notions which, indeed, found
some support  in  the  paternalist  tradition  of  the  authorities;  notions  which  the
people re-echoed so loudly in their turn that the authorities were, in some measure,
the prisoners of the people (Thompson 1991: 188-9).
5 By  examining  the  discourse  of  moral  outrage  that  the  post-Khairlanji  movement
produced, I would like to trace in detail the complexity involved in reclaiming officially
held moral precepts by those at the margins of Indian society. This brings us to another
important aspect of my study, namely the social meaning attached to the display of anger
by a powerless group.
6 As noted by Helena Flam (2005), the public display of anger by powerless groups entails
expressing a conflictual emotion, one that such groups are inclined to avoid in order to
facilitate  social  integration  and  prevent  repression  and  further  hardships.  As  was
emphasised earlier by Hochschild (1979), emotions have gender and class connotations.
Gender studies have shown that open manifestations of anger are generally a prerogative
of dominant males, and are used by them in a coercive manner. Flam thus suggests that
‘We must map out emotions which uphold social structures and relations of domination
to then show how social movements work to counter them’ (2005: 19). When inciting the
powerless  to  publicly  express  their  sense  of  injustice,  social  movements  work  on
emotions in an attempt to disturb such social mappings of authorised emotion, a process
Flam characterises as ‘the emotional re-framing of reality’ (2005: 19). By displacing them
from their authorised social location as attributes of the powerful, movements working
for  social  change  can  thus  derive  ‘subversive  counter  emotions’  out  of  formerly
‘cementing emotions’.3
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7 In  the  present  paper,  I  will  focus  on the  issue  of  moral  outrage  and  anger,  a
corresponding judgmental emotion, as a way for despised and marginal groups to occupy
the ‘moral high ground’. As James Jasper remarked, ‘It is their ability to provide a moral
voice that makes protest activities so satisfying.’ (1997: 5). The Dalits’ endeavour in this
regard is  especially  interesting,  since although they were defined as  Hindus (even if
marginal ones) by the Indian state, they were traditionally excluded from the dominant
Brahminical religion and thus denied any form of moral legitimacy. I will thus try to show
how, by expressing their anger and sense of moral outrage, they contested this denial of
their human worth.
 
From ‘meek Harijans’ to ‘angry Dalits’: the Dalit
movement and the making of emancipated subjects
8 Before  going  into  the  Khairlanji  case,  I  will  revisit  a  few  historical  events  that
Maharashtrian Buddhist Dalits (and Ambedkarite Dalits in other parts of India as well)
consider to be important landmarks in their social ‘awakening’ (jagran).  These events
have already been well described historically (Zelliot 1992) but they deserve to be looked
at again through the innovative lens of the emotional work theories. This preliminary
section will thus lay out the historical background of the post-Khairlanji protests so that
they may be understood as continuous with previous Dalit assertions.
9 In  the  Brahminical  view,  and  to  a  large  extent  in  the  officially  adopted  Gandhian
approach  of  the  untouchable  question,  Dalits  have  been  defined  as  lacking  culture,
knowledge  and  morality.  Since  the  late  nineteenth  century,  such  conceptions  were
publicised  by  those  very  Hindu  reformist  organisations  whose  struggles  against
untouchability  promoted  Dalits’  social,  religious  and  political  integration  within  a
reformed ‘Hindu community’  in the making.  The Arya Samaj  (founded in 1875)  thus
invented rituals of ‘purification’ (shuddhi), a symbolic act supposed to render them more
acceptable to orthodox caste Hindus. In the 1930’s, Gandhi’s charitable organisation, the
Harijan Sevak Sangh, defined social work towards Dalits as a prerogative of upper caste
citizens. It excluded Dalits themselves from its membership and encouraged ‘respectable
Hindu citizens’ to show their repentance and benevolence through moralistic propaganda
and hygienist programmes in the slums (Jaoul 2004).
10 The Dalit emancipation movement developed among the Dalit intelligentsia. It struggled
for a separate communal identity and political representation in the colonial setup, and
contested  such  reformist  views  as  patronising.  It  launched  social  awareness  (samajik
chetna) events aimed at an autonomous communal consciousness. One such event was the
public burning of the Manusmrti by Ambedkar (1891-1956) in 1927, a conservative Hindu
code  dating  from  1st century  in  which rigid  practises  of  untouchability  (as  well  as
segregation  of  women)  are  codified.  By  such  an act  of  defiance  to  the  Brahminical
orthodoxy, Dalits not only contested the justification of caste discrimination, but also
publicly expressed a moral judgment that found Hinduism lacking in morality. In this
way,  they  profoundly  upset  the  upper  caste  monopoly  on  knowledge,  religion  and
morality,  whom  Christian  missionaries  had  already  challenged.  Access  to  ‘religious’
knowledge (in Hindi the term dharmik has a larger meaning than just ‘religious’,  also
including one’s  sense of  duty and a  general  idea of  morality)  had been traditionally
denied to Dalits by the Brahminical tradition, only to be dispended in a charitable manner
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by the reformists once Dalits had been suitably ‘purified’.  Militant Dalits thus took a
radical  option  that  rejected  Hinduism  as  a  religion  whose  fundamental  core  was
hierarchical, and could not be reformed; reformism, in this view, was thus unfit to be a
project of a modernizing society based on principles of equality.
11 The mass conversion to Buddhism led by Ambedkar in October 1956, a few weeks before
he died, was a major step in this history of public and religious dissent. On this occasion,
the Mahars, the most important Dalit community of Maharashtra, and the one to which
Ambedkar belonged, collectively converted to the new emancipatory religion as it was
purposely redefined by him.
12 After two decades of unsuccessful electoral politics by the Republican Party of India (RPI),
the posthumous Ambedkarite party,  a new generation of educated Dalits,  inspired by
Afro-American radicalism,  formed the  Dalit  Panthers  in  1972.  While  identifying with
Ambedkar, they opposed the Dalit middle class for its lack of commitment, and decried
the Gandhian agenda of ‘Harijan uplift’4 that the nation had endorsed, and which had not
produced any significant improvements in Dalits’ condition. Rejecting the word ‘Harijan’
for its paternalism, they went back to an older word, ‘Dalit’ that had already been used by
the Arya Samaj at the beginning of the century in order to denounce untouchability as a
blot  on Hinduism.  Literally  meaning ‘the crushed ones’,  and often translated as  ‘the
oppressed’, this word was given a class connotation by the radicalised Dalit Panthers, who
wished  to  define  Dalits  as  the  community  of  the  oppressed,  without  restricting
themselves to ‘untouchables’.5 This new militant terminology, which gradually replaced
the Gandhian word ‘harijan’, carried a new meaning: rejecting the safe and patronising
view of ‘untouchables’ as the objects of reform from above (whether by the state or by
Gandhian  social  workers),  the  term  ‘Dalit’  called  instead  for  an  autonomous  and
revolutionary agency. Influenced by the Marxist idea of the proletariat as a revolutionary
agent of history, such a redefinition of Dalit identity valorised anger as the expression of
a legitimate moral stand taken by the oppressed. The autonomous redefinition of the self
along  militant  lines  demanded  public  manifestations  able  to  both  capture  general
attention, and to provide a new exemplar for the Dalit population. As with the burning of
the Manusmrti by Ambedkar decades earlier, one of the founding gestures of the Panthers
was to highlight publicly the political autonomy of Dalits by assaulting the national flag
during the silver jubilee of Independence. As the following extract from J. Gokhale shows,
they developed a command of the language of  outrage,  not only by publicising their
anger, but also by inspiring adverse reactions from nationalists at their outrageous acts of
defiance. To the new radical Dalit ideologues, being outraged was thus not enough; they
also felt the urge to display their rightful and daring ability to shock the conservative
sections of society, thus radically replacing the condition of victimhood by a threatening
image of Dalits as revolutionaries.  The politics of outrage was thus designed to instil
anger at the heart of the new militant Dalit identity, but also as a strategic device in order
to create controversy, mobilise opponents and catch the media’s attention. In a word the
repertoire of outrage was used strategically to gain publicity.
Raja Dhale published a vitriolic critique of the incident and policies of independent
India towards the dalits in the August, 1972, issue of Sadhana, a Marathi monthly.
He characterized the 25th anniversary of Indian independence as a black day. His
criticism of Indian independence brought swift reaction from the Jan Sangh and the
Shiv Sena; they led morchas to the office of Sadhana and threatened to burn down
the magazine as well as the offending article. Those parties also urged the Indian
Government to punish Dhale for his lack of respect to the national flag. Throughout
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1972 and 1973 the Marathi press gave interviews of Dhale and other future Panther
leaders such as Namdeo Dhasal. Thus by 1973 members of this young, somewhat
militant, stream within the Dalit movement had gained a measure of publicity for
themselves  and  for  their  ideas  and  had  also  succeeded  to  some  extent  in
establishing a political identity separate and distinct from the RPI. (Gokhale 1993:
267-8)
13 The growing caste/class tensions in the countryside between the Dalit rural poor and the
dominant castes was emphasised in a Dalit  Panther manifesto (Murugkar,  1991).  In a
context of rising unemployment among educated young males in all sections of society,
the educated Dalit youth’s aspirations and frustrations provided a breeding ground for
such radicalisation. In villages, these educated and assertive young men openly defied the
caste order. Casteist crimes against Dalits—legally labelled ‘atrocities’ by the Scheduled
Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  Prevention  of  Atrocities  Act,  1955—were  on  the  rise,
intended to ‘teach lessons’ to assertive Dalit villagers through public humiliation rituals,
arsons, rapes and massacres. In this context of growing insecurity and distress, the Dalit
Panthers gave a voice to the popular disapproval of electoral politics in general and of the
divided leadership of the RPI in particular. The factionalism of the Ambedkarite party was
resented as a form of  political  impotency leading to powerlessness,  and was morally
condemned  as  motivated  by  the  selfishness  and  careerism  of  the  Dalit  bourgeoisie
(Gokhale 1993).
14 The Dalit Panthers’ politics of anger was thus pitted against regular politics, pictured as
the  realm  of  self-interested  politicking,  compromises  and  deals.  The  Dalit  Panthers
defined themselves as the outcry of a genuine and irrepressible emotion, an expression of
moral disapproval that gave birth to the revolutionary agency of the Dalits.
15 The growing tension in the Maharashtrian countryside crystallised into anti-Dalit riots
that stormed the Marathwada region in August 1978, where 19 people died and thousands
of Dalits fled their villages (Gokhale 1993). Although there was a class dimension to the
violence against Dalit villagers (who are mostly employed as agricultural labourers and
whom the dominant castes thus wished to coerce violently), the upper castes’ growing
resentment towards Dalit militancy was focused mainly on the educated sections’ social
mobility thanks to job quotas in the administration. The Ambedkarite emphasis on social
and political activism by educated Dalits was perceived as potentially disruptive for the
social order of the villages. The riot was significantly triggered by a symbolic measure: in
June  1978  the  Maharashtra  government  accepted the  Dalit  demand of  renaming the
Aurangabad  University  after  Ambedkar.  This  gave  official  recognition  to  the  Dalit
community’s  great  man,  whose biography was turned into a  role  model  of  the Dalit
intelligentsia’s  commitment  to  their  community.  As  I  have  argued  regarding  the
installation of Ambedkar statues in Uttar Pradesh, Dalit activists’ struggles for the public
recognition of their great man was also an attempt to highlight their own moral authority
within the Dalit community (Jaoul 2006).
16 The decision to rename the university was perceived as an official boost to Dalits among
upper caste students in the Aurangabad region (Marathwada), who expressed their fury
and struck back at Dalit villagers. Apart from the material reasons that motivated such
staunch opposition (like the fear that the making of a Dalit stronghold would allow Dalits
to advance in terms of jobs and social position), Lata Murugkar also explains how, at a
more symbolic level, such a renaming meant the outrageous intrusion of a ‘defiling’ Dalit
symbol  into the private space of  the upper castes,  since people routinely hang their
university diplomas on the walls of their residences (Murugkar 1991). 
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17 In the face of a massive anti-Dalit pogrom in which Dalit lives were lost—including five
Dalit  protestors  who  died  during  police  repression—and  public  property  worth  300
million rupees was destroyed, the government eventually backed off from renaming the
university.  To protest against this setback,  the Dalit  Panthers launched the Namantar
(‘name change’) movement. It culminated in a ‘Long March’ (inspired by the prestigious
Chinese event) throughout Maharashtra that converged on Aurangabad on 6 December
1979, Ambedkar’s death anniversary, thus giving an additional emotional charge to the
event (Murugkar 1991). 
18 Through their March, Dalit activists sought to highlight the discrepancy between official
values  claimed  by  the  Indian  nation  and  the  still  prevailing  caste  prejudices.  Since
Ambedkar drafted the Indian Constitution, Dalits always insisted on the conformity of
their  movement  to  the  ideals  of  Indian  nationalism,  whose  official  modern  values
Ambedkar  had espoused.  Hence,  Dalits  could  conveniently  argue  that  by  opposing
Ambedkar’s  official  recognition for the sake of  preserving their  caste hegemony,  the
upper castes in fact opposed the very constitutional values of the Indian nation.
19 The emphasis on the Constitution (as is emphasised in Dalit iconography; see Jaoul 2006)
always helped Ambedkarite activists to frame their struggle as a defence of official values,
in opposition to unofficial caste practises. In this sense, the Dalit movement has always
claimed  to  embody  the  true  implementation  of  Indian  democratic  principles,  those
enshrined in a constitution that they somehow regard as ‘sacred’.
20 While  playing  with  the  idea  of  breaking  with  the  Indian  state,  the  Dalit  Panthers’
revolutionary  commitment  was  short-lived  (Murugkar,  1991)  and  remained  purely
rhetorical.  Dalit mobilisation  against  caste  oppression  has,  in  general,  remained
ambiguous in its relationship to the state, criticising the hidden caste prejudices of the
ruling class while at the same time making use of democratic laws and constitutional
means committed to the legal  struggle  against  caste.  Hence the Dalit  movement has
combined the three levels of moral contestation identified by Barrington Moore (1978), 6
which are: 1/ the criticism of one part of the ruling class for violating their own moral
norms (this corresponds to Dalit criticism of the upper caste nationalist elite);  2/ the
criticism of  all  of  the ruling class (an option that corresponds to the Dalit  Panthers’
inclusion of the RPI politicians and the Dalit bourgeoisie in their critique of the ruling
class); 3/ the revolutionary step of moral repudiation of all the norms that are used by the
dominant  strata  to  justify  its  domination.  (This  corresponds  to  the  rejection  of  the
reformist elites’ approach to the untouchable question that informed Independent India’s
social welfare programmes. It also illustrates the fact that the pro-marxist faction of the
Dalit Panthers became tempted to ally with the Maoist option of armed struggle against
the  post-colonial,  bourgeois  state,  before  being  marginalised  by  the  more  orthodox
Ambedkarite Buddhists).7 Moore asks the following question: ‘Put crudely the issue is this:
do the lower strata really give a dam about the reigning principles of legitimacy in their
society?’  (Moore  1978:  89).  Obviously,  this  trivial  but  essential  question  cannot  be
answered  so  simply  without  sacrificing  the  extreme  complexity  of  subaltern
consciousness, and the derivative, ambivalent, and even at times ironic and parodic uses
of dominant principles and ethics. In order to have a better idea of such a complex issue,
first raised by Thompson in his seminal study on moral economy (1991), one needs to
examine cases like the Khairlanji issue and protests in details, in order to understand how
these different options might in fact articulate with one another, rather than necessarily
come into conflict.  A short  answer to Moore’s  question would be that  the Khairlanji
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outrage over constitutional values shows how much Dalits do in fact care about these
constitutional values that gave official status to their claim of being equal human beings,
and how much democratic ideals have been appropriated by their movement. But the
fascinating  complexities  involved  in  the  subaltern  approach  to  principles  officially
adopted  by  the  ruling  class  provide  enough of  a  reason to  further  inquire  into  the
concrete processes by which democratic  principles are entrenched at  the margins of
Indian society.
 
The possibility of the massacre: Dalit assertion
without political power
21 The first thing that struck my mind when I reached Nagpur in the second half of April
2008,  was the overwhelming physical  presence of  the Ambedkarite  movement in the
landscape, notably posters and banners of the Ambedkar icon as well as the plastic blue
flags covering many streets and crossings. These obviously remained from the recent
Ambedkar  Jayanti  (birthday  celebrations)  held  on  a  large  scale  by  the  Buddhist
community of Maharashtra every 14th of April.  One and a half years after the violent
Khairlanji protests, this appropriation of public space seemed to have added meaning, as
if to signify that no effort would be spared in the struggle against the marginalisation of
the dissident  Dalit  community.8 This  marginalization was due not  so much to Dalits’
economic or  social  position,  since they had an important  middle class  in the city of
Nagpur, but was more political in nature, due to the continuing failure of Ambedkarite
politics.
22 In  the  2004  national  elections,  the  main  RPI  faction  leaders  entered  into  electoral
arrangements with the NCP-Congress combine that eventually won the election. While
they managed to survive politically by bargaining their share of votes with mainstream
parties, the Dalit leaders had scattered the votes of their local communities and failed to
provide  them  the  official  support  that  the  client-based  functioning  of  the  Indian
administrative set up requires.
23 During my fieldtrip, I heard much popular resentment against these leaders, accused of
selling  the  community’s  political  interests  for  the  sake  of  their  own  positions  and
personal gains,  thus reviving the Dalit  Panthers’  critique of electoral  politics.  Two of
these  leaders  who  hailed  from  the  region had  been  rewarded  through  nominated
positions by the Congress,  which was in power both at  the state and central  levels.9
However, beneficial to the leaders themselves, these positions did not provide their local
community with any significant political support in the local setup. The local Buddhist
electorate had been increasingly deserting the RPI faction leaders, and shared their votes
between new local  Ambedkarite  formations,  the Congress  and the BSP.10 The Sharad
Pawar-led NCP had a reputation of being the party of the dominant rural community, the
Kunbis, estimated to be about a third of the Vidarbha population and to be the principal
landholding  community  (and  thus  possessing  the  requisite  criteria  by  which
M. N. Srinivas  defined  a  locally  dominant  caste:  majority  landholding,  numerical
dominance, and ritual status).
24 Although Buddhists are only 6.39% of the total Maharashtra population, they represent
13.1% in the Vidarbha region, and their proportion is even higher (25% according to local
estimates) in Nagpur city. Their Nagpur strongholds (Indora, Kampti, Sitabuldi…) do not
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display the poverty usually witnessed in urban India’s Dalit areas. Many former slums,
like Chota Indora, now have well built houses and large Boddh Vihars that testify to the
relative prosperity of the Dalit urban middle class. But in the surrounding rural districts,
the  Buddhist  community  remains  economically  disadvantaged and dependent  on the
dominant  Other  Backward  Castes  (OBCs)—Kunbis  or  Telis  depending  on the  area—as
agricultural labourers.  Although specific data on Vidarbha are not available,  the 2001
census  indicates  that  in  Maharashtra  as  a  whole,  65.5  %  of  the  Mahar  (Buddhist)
population is rural, while 48.5 per cent work as agricultural labourers.11 It can thus be
estimated from these figures that three quarters of the rural Mahars occupy the bottom
of the rural class structure.12 The people whom I met in the Buddhist lanes of Tumser
town (the nearest town to Khairlanji, in Bhandara district) acknowledged that the local
bidi (artisanal cigarettes) manufacture business helped the poor of the region to be less
dependent on the exceedingly low rural wages. Rolling bidi at home made their lives less
miserable than those Dalits of other poor regions of the state (like Marathwada), who
depended on such wages alone to make a living (sometimes as low as 30-40 rupees a day,
according to them, which is equivalent to less than half the legal minimum wage). Despite
this gap between the rural and the urban Dalits, progress in education was universally
acknowledged. ‘You’ll find someone educated in each home’, a Buddhist from Tumser said
to me with pride, implying achievement and social awareness. Several people I met even
boasted  that  Dalits  had  reached  the  same  educational  level  as  Brahmins  and  were
intellectually  far  ahead  of  the  dominant  OBC  castes,  whom  they  referred  to
contemptuously as ‘other log’  (‘other people’),  a local expression for ‘other backward
castes’; the spite between OBCs and Dalits was thus not one way, but largely reciprocated.
As far as I understood it, the expression that could be translated as ‘the remaining ones’
seemed to imply contempt in the sense that these middle castes were neither ‘pure’ or
twice-born Hindus, nor opponents of caste hierarchy like them, and thus lacked a clear-
cut ideology and social identity. Emphasising their own emancipation, Dalits took pride in
their conversion to Buddhism, which implied rebellion, choice and agency.
25 Their actual powerlessness contrasted sharply with their daring and outright criticisms
of the powerful (as I witnessed in person a few times, when Dalit openly criticised or
mocked OBCs to their faces in order to embarrass them in front of me, for example by
recalling how they had abandoned anti-Brahmin leaders from their own castes like Phule,
the founder of the anti-Brahmin struggle whose social memory now lives on only by dint
of Dalits’ acts of remembrance). Despite its assertive behaviour, the Buddhist community
was in a vulnerable position, and the consequences of this became dramatically clear in
Khairlanji, where they were ‘taught a lesson’ and ‘put in their place’ by the Kunbis.
26 In this small village of a little less than 800 inhabitants, there are 181 households, out of
which 157 are OBCs (mostly Kunbis) and 20 are Gonds (scheduled tribes), according to
official  sources. The Bhotmanges were one of  3  isolated Buddhist  families.  They had
moved in 1986 from another village after inheriting 7 acres of land. Facing harassment
and discrimination in the village, the Bhotmange decided to move out and build their
house  illegally  at  the  outskirts  of  spare  communal  land.  They  lived  with  constant
harassment  at  the  hands  of  the  dominant  Kunbi  caste.  The  farmers  whose  land
neighboured their own alleged that they needed a road to access their fields. In 1996, the
Panchayat (village council) requested the use of 2 acres of their land for this purpose. The
Bhotmange  had  to  abide  by  this  decision,  hopeful  that  this  would  help  them  gain
acceptance. They began to oppose the municipality, however, when it claimed 2 more
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acres under the pretext of carrying on new development works.13 The two Bhotmange
sons, one of them partially blind and the other a college graduate, assisted their parents
economically by doing agricultural labour job; the daughter, who was the most promising
in her studies (the year preceding the murder, she came first in the whole Bhandara
district’s  12th class  final  exam  and  was  awarded  a  prize)  and  who  nurtured  higher
professional ambitions, had plans to join a training center of army officers. One of their
relatives, Siddharth Ghajbiye, was a police patil (a village representative appointed to the
local police) and a Congress activist. He assisted the Bhotmange in their children’s studies
and advised them about their legal and administrative struggle to retain their land. On
September 3, 2006, returning from their house, Ghajbiye was severely beaten up by a mob
of villagers who resented his role. Fifteen persons were named in the complaint, who
were  formally  identified  at  the  police  station by  the  two  Bhotmange  women. The
dominant caste took this as a daring act of defiance, which would eventually cost the
Bhotmange very dearly. The morning before the massacre, twelve of the accused in the
Ghajbiye case were arrested by the police in Khairlanji to be questioned at the local court
of Mohadi. The decision to release them on bail was an irresponsible act that was only
made possible due to the technical ‘omission’ of not registering the case under the SC-ST
(Prevention of atrocities) Act. Not only does such a law normally apply in casteist crimes
against members of Dalit castes, but the local judicial authorities were expected to be all
the  more  alert  since  the  district  is  listed  as  prone  to  Dalit  atrocities.  This  deadly
negligence can only be explained by the clout enjoyed by the Kunbis in local  power
structures as well as the lack of such informal administrative support for Dalits.
27 When they were returning to Khairlanji from the court, the twelve accused became drunk
and were incited by a local member of the legislative assembly from their community to
take due revenge and put Dalits in their place. The released Kunbi men were in the mood
for revenge. After stopping their tractor in front of the Bhotmange’s hut and threatening
to finish off the entire family, they went searching for Siddharth Ghajbiye. Since they
couldn’t put their hands on him, they eventually went back to the Bhotmange’s where
they captured the four members of the family (the mother Surekha, 44, the daughter
Priyanka, 18 and the two sons, Roshan, 21 and Sudhir, 23); the father Bhayyalal was off
working in his field. Dragged to the main village square where a crowd gathered, the four
victims  were  savagely  beaten  with  sticks  and  bicycle  chains.  According  to  the  Dalit
witnesses’ version, the women were paraded naked in the village and finally gang raped
and killed. The two boys were sexually mutilated after refusing to rape their mother and
sister and died on the spot after being further brutalised and humiliated by the crowd.
28 Although Siddharth Ghajbiye called the police at 6:15 p.m. while the avenging mob was on
its way back from his village to Khairlanji (just before the killing took place), the police
only reached there at 8:30 p.m., observed that everything was calm, made no further
enquiry, and even neglected to transmit a report of the visit as normal police procedure
would mandate. On the next day, when Bhayyalal tried to lodge a complaint with the
police, he was ignored by the police officer for no other obvious reason than being a Dalit.
Later in the day the police found the dead bodies in a canal and he was eventually called
in to give a First Information Report, in which he named 38 active participants to the
massacre, including the village headman, the deputy headman and a police constable on
duty in the village.
29 The first reports that came out in the local press mention that only 28 persons were
arrested, without giving any indication of the mob’s gruesome acts.14 They imputed the
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murder to the villagers’ attempt to punish Surekha Bhotmange for an alleged liaison with
her relative, Siddharth Ghajbiye. The police obviously knew that this allegation (which
the accused had already made after they beat up Ghajbiye)  was false,  since the land
dispute  between  the  Bhotmange  and  the  villagers  had  been  called  to  the  local
administration’s  attention several  times.  By reporting this  motive  for  the crime,  the
press, astonishingly, seemed to accept wholesale the idea that the mob had acted in order
to  protect  the  village’s  ‘moral  standards’.  By  concealing  the  casteist  motives, the
authorities for their part had sought to avoid a violent conflagration during the October 2
nd national commemoration in Nagpur of the golden jubilee of Ambedkar’s conversion to
Buddhism. The huge mass gathering was attended by the Buddhist community from all
over  Maharashtra  and beyond,  and this  heavy  Buddhist  presence  created favourable
conditions for a major insurrection if the casteist nature of the massacre became known.
30 The priority given to maintaining law and order at the cost of the truth, however, carried
a deep bias and made common cause with the murderers, for whom this was an implicit
sign that the administration would side by them. Indeed, the perpetrators’ actions show
that  they  already  took  this  official  complicity  for  granted.  It  is  precisely  this  self-
assurance that  encouraged them to teach the assertive  and successful  Dalit  family  a
macabre lesson in full public view without taking the least precaution, to the extent that
they even neglected to properly conceal the corpses, which were simply dumped in the
nearest canal in the village itself. It is therefore as if the massacre was not sufficient in
itself: what they sought was a specifically public demonstration that they could commit
the atrocity with impunity, a public statement that their local rule was above and beyond
the law.
 
Beyond ‘axiological neutrality’ and ‘participant
observation’: what to do with our emotions when
studying injustice?
In a sham imitation of the natural sciences, the
social sciences have attempted to ignore the fact
that, in their domain, the researcher and its object
are made of the same stuff. 
Alban Bensa15
31 In taking up the issue of emotions, we need to consider how we, as ethnographers, deal
with our own emotions in our relationship to our subject of study, and how the people
with whom we interact in the field can influence us emotionally, especially when the
subject in question has strong moral implications. When dealing with injustice, and even
more so with massacres, in which the very value of human dignity is explicitly denied, it
becomes morally difficult to maintain academic neutrality. While writing the first version
of this paper for our ‘outraged communities’  workshop, I  felt astonished and morally
shocked by the level of human cruelty in evidence at Khairlanji. Taking the emotion work
of  the  protestors  as  an object  of  study,  which implies  a  form of  distancing from or
objectification of emotions, did not prevent me from being affected myself, as I initially
believed such a reflexive methodological stand would do. In order to continue the work
without letting the emotions become too overwhelming, I had to build some resistance
against  the  profound  disgust  and  sympathy  I  felt  towards  the  perpetrators  of  the
massacre and the victims respectively. The need that I felt to control my emotions was an
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endeavour on my part to conform to the academic ethos, which strongly believes in the
Weberian notion of axiological neutrality.16 Himself both politically involved as a citizen,
and  distanced  when working  academically  or  teaching  his  students,  Weber  however
insisted that the social scientist needs to leave behind all her/his political preferences
and value judgements when practicing her/his profession. However, serious doubts have
recently been raised about the way this notion has been used in the academic world. First,
the concept of axiological neutrality itself is a mistranslation of Weber’s expression of
‘wehrtfreiheit’,  meaning  literally,  ‘detachment  from  values’.  In  her  recent  French
translation of Weber, Isabelle Kalinowski has noted that the first French translation by
Julien Freund and the foreword by Raymond Aron was itself  not free from polemical
intentions. In fact, Aron, who had right leanings, used the French publication of Weber’s
two  conferences  to  discredit  the  French  leftist intellectual’s  political  involvement
(Kalinowski 2005).
32 As  noted  by  Kalinowski,  the  concept  of  axiological  neutrality  differs  from  Weber’s
German expression (‘wehrtfreiheit’) whose right translation could also be ‘non imposition
of values’, if we are take into account the situation that Weber discussed. Weber mainly
addressed his criticism to university professors using their position’s authority in the
classrooms for the sake of nationalistic propaganda. Kalinowski also notes that Weber’s
original  expression differs from ‘axiological  neutrality’  from the point of  view of the
translation’s evocation of a natural sciences model of scientificity. The misinterpreted
Weberian concept was subsequently used purposely by sociologists in their attempt to
present their academic discipline as conforming to the model of the natural sciences
(Kalinowski 2005). I would like to add from my own experience, as a young researcher
whose extensive fieldwork in the Dalit movement has at times been criticised by some
colleagues as lacking neutrality, that many social scientists who do not practise fieldwork
or practise it in a limited or superficial manner without getting personally involved with
the  milieus  they  study  also  seem  to  have  found  in  such  a  concept  a  convenient
justification for the safe distance they have maintained in the field.
33 In Involvement and Detachment, Elias takes note of the way such a distanced approach by
social scientists has reached the status of an academic ethos, with:
(...) institutionalised procedures of control, that exercise a strong pressure on each
scientist taken individually, and that aim at subordinating subjective tendencies to
an interest ‘in the thing in itself’, as we are accustomed saying, and therefore to a
more distanciated conception of his or her task’ (1993 [1983] :13).17
34 As far as I can observe concerning my own case, when studying the Khairlanji events,
although I tried to impose the academic norm of neutrality on myself, I realised that what
I could achieve was at best a cynical attitude, which by the way is nothing short of an
emotional  state  of  mind,  in  spite  of  its  conduciveness  to  economic  rationality  and
apparent mastery. Such an attitude was also uncomfortable because it did not match my
own personal sensitivity to issues of social injustice and moreover because the Khairlanji
events are truly and deeply shocking. After having two nightmares related to/adapted
from, the Khairlanji events, I realised that the emotions that Khairlanji had created inside
me could not be wished away so easily and that they had manifested themselves through
the ‘back door’ of my subconscious. I came to the conclusion - similar to that described by
J. Favret-Saada (1990) in her ethnographic account of her emotional involvement with
practitioners of witchcraft in rural France (1990), that experiencing, if not sharing in, the
emotional  texture  of  a  social  movement,  can  be  a  legitimate  and  valuable  part  of
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ethnographic work. From this perspective, the moral dilemmas that I experienced, torn
as I was in between a professional ethos of axiological neutrality and my own feelings,
could be pragmatically dealt with as part of my study. Personal involvement in the field
requires dealing subsequently with the emotions that this can elicit,  thus implying a
deeper and more difficult process of objectification, and a more critical examination of
the  ethnographer’s  relationship  to  the  field.  And  insofar  as  it  leads  to  important
methodological  questions  regarding  the  social  conditions  of  the  production  of
ethnographic knowledge, it is also valuable. This implies a departure not only from the
dogma  of  axiological  neutrality,  but  also  from  the  naïve  ethnographic  method  of
participant-observation,  in  preference  for  what  Bourdieu  has  called  ‘participant
objectification’.  In  his  critique  of  participant-observation,  Bourdieu  insists  the
ethnographer  must  think  critically  of  his  own  presence  as  part  of  the  situation  he
observes, and must analyse the social meanings and conditions of possibility of the very
situation of ethnographic inquiry (2003). From this perspective, the moral dilemmas I
experienced need to  be pragmatically  dealt  with as  inherent  to  my study.  Following
Bourdieu’s  suggestions,  and  based  on  my own fieldwork  experience,  I  would  like  to
reintroduce  the  issue  of  the  ethnographer’s  emotions  in  the  reflection  on  the
ethnographic situation. Weber and Elias both situate the tension between involvement
and detachment at the level of personal values, but do not analyse the way emotions
intervene at a far more concrete psychological level.
35 Being a specialist on the Dalit movement—a movement denied legitimacy and stigmatised
in  Indian  society—my  presence  as  a  foreign  academic  and  therefore  a  prestigious
potential  sympathiser  meant  something  to  the  local  activists,  who  have  historically
sought from foreign academics the recognition that Indian intellectuals have refused to
give them. During my PhD fieldwork on the Ambedkarite movement in Kanpur, Uttar
Pradesh,  I  was  warmly  welcomed  by  the  local  Dalit  Panthers  organisation,  and
considerable trust was put in me: all doors were open to me, I was given free access to the
organisation’s  archives,  and I  was never stopped from asking even very probing and
insistent questions regarding contradictions within the movement. All this was certainly
part of an affective ‘strategy’ in order to gain a supporter from a foreign university of the
‘first world’ (if we accept that such a sense of purpose does not preclude sincerity or
authentic  friendship,  but  even  creates  a  fertile  ground  for  such  sincere  feelings  to
develop). In its usual meaning, ‘strategy’ is a term that implies conscious calculation, and
yet strategies can also operate at a much more subtle, unconscious and intricate level,
and indeed, can be all the more effective when they are only partly conscious, less visible
and rooted in sincere intentions and beliefs. The result of this ‘strategic’ generosity on
the part of the people on whom I depended for my research was that I felt a moral debt
towards those who had not only given me the knowledge that I valued, but who had also
become hosts —I ended up living at the Dalit Panthers’ headquarters— and friends. While
writing my dissertation I  realised how much I  had become emotionally bound to the
movement,  which  made  objectification  at  times  morally  and  affectively  difficult  to
maintain (as, for example, when it came to shedding critical light on the actions of a
personal friend). However, once I managed to deal with these dilemmas (by prioritising
the  academic  value  of  producing  critical  knowledge,  and  by  reasoning  that  my
constructive criticism was the best service I could render to a movement which suffered,
no doubt as every social  movement does,  from several  contradictions),  I  realised the
scientific  value  of  this  more  arduous  process  of  detachment.  For  my  emotional
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involvement  in  fieldwork  generated  some  scientific  findings  that  a  more  distanced
approach would not have permitted.  I  realised,  for example,  that Dalit  activists  used
techniques for generating emotional attachment in order to create support among elite
Dalit bureaucrats, such as treating them as gods on earth in their meetings. My own lived
experience as an ethnographer thus gave me clues to understanding, and reinforced one
of the main findings of my thesis. My aim was to question instrumentalist theories, whose
utilitarian interpretation of  ethnic identities as imposed from above fails  to ask how
practices  of  identity  formation  are  reciprocally  used  from  below.  Thanks  to  my
experience with the emotional techniques employed by the movement, I could see that
the movement was a form of instrumentalism from below, an endeavour by poor people
to  build  social  and  political  capital  so  as  to  compensate  for  their  marginality  and
powerlessness.  The sometimes flattering way in which I was treated as a French PhD
scholar  (by  taking  me to  the  station and garlanding me with  flowers  at  the  end of
fieldtrips, for instance) was an adaptation of some already well-tried, partly flattering
and partly affectionate techniques of emotional cooption of the elite by people seeking
their loyalty.
36 My visit to Khairlanji with a local organiser of the Dalit protests (a successful Buddhist
hailing from Tumser, who had become economically well off thanks to his flourishing
private schools network) once more shows the value of such a methodological stand when
dealing with the emotion work of social movements. Arguing that I had decided to focus
my fieldwork exclusively on the protests and not on the victims or the massacre itself, I
refused my host’s and another local prominent Ambedkarite activist’s offers to pay a visit
to the only survivor of the family, Bhayyalal Bhotmange, who was also the mute witness
of the murder of his family. His photograph and statements had been printed many times
in the press. I felt uncomfortable approaching this suffering man and reviving his pain
when he had already been harassed by the media in the aftermath of the massacre. I felt
the media had been unconscionably voyeuristic and I wished to avoid that. However, I
now recognise that while taking this moral stand, at a more unconscious level, I  also
wanted to avoid exposing myself to Bhayyalal Bhotmange whose helplessness and terrible
fate would have been a cause of psychological discomfort.
37 After staying at Tumser, the closest town to Khairlanji, where I enquired about the local
protests, my host took me back to Nagpur in his car. Arguing that the main road would be
of less interest from a scenic point of view, he took a bypass. After a few kilometres he
stopped the car and showed me the ‘Khairlanji’ sign on the bus stop, where the link road
that led to the village started. Although I had previously refused his offer to take me to
see the victims’ house, he asked me again to let him, arguing that I should see it with my
own eyes, and also that I should have a ‘feel’ (bhavna) for Khairlanji. In other words, he
meant that if I wanted to understand the issue properly, emotions had to come into the
picture. I now realise how fine and perceptive an adviser he was, since the Khairlanji
movement on  which  I  wanted  to  focus,  was  principally  about  raising  emotions.
Sometimes, the best approach to fieldwork is to let people take you where they want or
feel you should go; the difficulty in this is accepting a temporary loss of control over the
course of the enquiry, but it allows you to understand how people perceive your scientific
intentions and try to respond to or change them. We passed the main square of the
village,  where the administrative premises (the school  and the Panchayat)  stood,  and
where the rape and massacre had taken place 18 months earlier. A police picket had been
installed in the Panchayat premises to protect the village from retaliation. The police
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stopped us, asked our identities and phoned their superiors. I began to regret having
accepted my host’s offer because of the time wasted and the stress caused by the police
check, but the authorisation eventually came as a relief. It was interesting in itself that
we were allowed to go and see the house, but forbidden to take any photographs. This
official reaction was the first clue given to me of the importance and sensitivity of this
image. Accompanied by two constables, we walked to the outskirts of the village where
the precarious and decaying Bhotmange hutment,  made of  uncemented bricks and a
thatched roof, stood. The barriers put around the house by the judicial authorities, and
the police tent beside it,  were the only reminders that a crime had taken place.  The
banality  of  village  life  that  we  witnessed  while  walking  there  and  back  at  sunset
contrasted awkwardly with the narratives of the heinous crime. I toyed with the thought
that villagers whose path I crossed may have been among the crowd who assisted the
murderers, but a judgmental attitude felt inappropriate on my part. Taking a moralistic
stand  towards  them  was  a  statement  of  superiority,  since  judging  morally  always
amounts  to  assuming  a  superior  subject-position.  Moreover,  because  I  am  a  French
academic, and therefore perceived as a person of status, publicly taking a moral stand
was to flaunt the edge I had over them; in more personal terms, this meant acting against
my  moral  and  political  standards,  playing  the  white  European  invoking  superiority
among Indian villagers. While we were walking with the police constables and were being
observed by the villagers, my host openly acknowledged that he was using my presence
in the village to assuage the Dalits’ moral outrage, and give the caste villagers the feeling
of being judged by the outside world. Although I generally do not mind being ‘used’ by my
informants—since  I  also  ‘use’  them,  the  economy of  the  ethnographic  situation thus
becomes less awkwardly one-sided—this particular situation paradoxically put me at odds
with my personal ethics as an anthropologist, whose job is to understand people rather
than to judge them. I came to realise that my own dominant social status and Dalits’
subaltern position gave a very different social meaning to our socially situated expression
of moral outrage. Favret-Saada notes that ‘While experiencing the intensities linked to a
particular  place,  one  can  further  grasp  that  each  one  presents  a  particular  sort  of
objectivity’ (1990: 7).18 Although the idea of empathy on which participant-observation is
founded seems methodologically dubious, it is always possible to take advantage of one’s
own socially situated perceptions as an indication of how subjectivities interact in the
ethnographic situation. In his ‘Remarks on the politics of intersubjectivity’, Alban Bensa
notes that:
The intimate confrontation between moral consciousness and the scientific project
is never as strong as the decision to put the enquiry’s underlying power relations
on the table, or when we risk speaking in the first person in a scholarly universe
that often turns the silence with respect to oneself into a guise of objectivity (Bensa
2008: 326).19
38 While writing my paper, the experience of my visit to Khairlanji and the psychological
discomfort I felt afterwards induced me to rethink my reticence about confronting the
victim and his house, as well as my host’s insistence on taking me there. It gave me a clue
to the kind of emotional work that a movement trying to influence the public opinion in
its favour might pursue, and the way social scientists can be exposed and react to this
emotional work. Taking me to Khairlanji was part of the work that the activist wished to
perform on me, and it  reiterated what the movement had itself  done to sensitise its
audience  to  the  unjust  and  terrible  fate  of  an  innocent  family.  In  Nagpur,  where  I
continued  my  enquiry  on  the  post-Khairlanji  protests,  the  respondents  to  whom  I
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introduced myself repeatedly asked me if I had met Bhaiyalal and seen the house. These
questions made me realise the importance of both in the Khairlanji narrative. According
to them, having been personally exposed to these signifiers of the outrage was part of
reporting adequately on the matter,  somewhat like the situation with Favret  Saada’s
witchcraft  participants,  who were of  the opinion that  only those having experienced
witchcraft could talk about it or be told of it (1990). In other words, agreeing to expose
oneself  to  the  contagious  and  potentially  powerful  emotional  matrix  of  a  moral
community (be it witchcraft or Dalit activist circles), can be part of the ethnographer’s
work, allowing her/him to gain acceptance in the milieus she/he wants to study, even as
she/he is faced with the ‘danger’ of ‘being affected’, to use the title of Favret Saada’s
article.
39 The images of an ordinary poor villager and of an ordinary poor people’s hut had been
printed again and again in the NGO reports and press articles. They were central to the
framing of the massacre in terms of an outrage to commonly held family and domestic
values.  I  therefore  realise  that  I  had  simply  been  exposed  by  the  activist  to  a  re-
enactment  of  his  movement’s  emotional  work,  this  time for  the sake of  emotionally
converting the foreign observer to its cause. The two nightmares I had—in the first, I was
in hiding from a bunch of peasants whom I witnessed massacring my own family, and in
the second my deceased father’s body was exhumed by medical order for a post-mortem
cancer  ‘treatment’—show that  the  emotion  work  done  on  me  had  worked  wonders:
despite having struggled to maintain some emotional distance and remain within the
academic  boundaries  of  axiological  neutrality,  these  emotions  operated  on  me  at  a
deeper, unconscious level.
 
The movement’s narrative of outrage: intermingled
themes and audiences
40 The Khairlanji outrage was framed at two distinct yet intertwined levels, for two different
sets of audience: the general public and the local Buddhist community. While specific
themes  were  more  or  less  emphasised  for  these  different  audiences,  they  could  be
synthesised  into  a  single,  yet  adaptable,  narrative.  Before  analysing  in  details  the
specificities of these different discourses, I would like to show how they were actually
combined and how they supported one another. These different narrative versions were
not purposively tailored to their audiences,  but rather resulted from a collective and
multifarious framing process, in which the narrators’ own cultural background and their
more or less strategic anticipations of the audiences determined the style and content of
the narratives. When directed at the wider media audience, I noted that it was often the
destruction of a family that was emphasised, and through it the breaching of the shared
domestic values that are a central and deep rooted feature of Indian popular ethics. An
Ambedkarite NGO report available on the internet that related the visit of a fact finding
team one week after the massacre thus printed the picture of the house of the victims on
its cover page (Figure 1).  On the second page,  a picture of the interior with cooking
utensils and food strewn on the ground was accompanied by the following caption: ‘Inside
the hut Mrs. Surekha was cooking and children studying when caste Hindu mob attacked
family’ (Figure 2).20 Although the report came from a Buddhist NGO, it was published on
the internet to serve as material for mainstream journalists writing on the issue, and thus
intended to anticipate their search for themes that could touch the general Indian public.
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Interestingly the pictures of the house were reproduced on a large scale by the media
who sent their photographers to Khairlanji, and these pictures of the hutment became
the visual signifiers of the assault on domestic values.
 
Figure 1. Cover of a Buddhist NGO (Manuski advocacy center) report: ‘home of the Bhotmange
family’
 
The ‘Righteous Anger’ of the PowerlessInvestigating Dalit Outrage over Caste ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
16
Figure 2. Page 2 of the Manuski report: interior of the Bhotmange home and identity photograph of
Priyanka Bhotmange
41 Stressing even further the intensity of the moral outrage to Indian values, the NGO report
highlights  the  conformity  of  the  massacred  family  to  widely  praised  values  and
consensual goals of Indian society, like hardwork (mehnet) and social ‘uplift’ of the Dalits
(Harijanuddhar or Dalituddhar, an old Hindu reformist theme) through education and
self-restraint. The poor but successful Dalit family was depicted as exemplary and abiding
by  the  nation’s  ideals,  thus  heightening  the  injustice  that  had  been  their  fate.  The
message that was conveyed to the Buddhist community by the movement organisers also
relied on these images of a poor and law-abiding Buddhist family that incarnated the
nation’s official values despite the hardships inflicted on them by the dominant caste. The
images of  Bhayyalal  and the house were equally  central  in conveying these ideas  of
injustice (Figure 3 illustrates how Bhayyalal is depicted as a living symbol of injustice).
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Figure 3. Page 6 (last page) of Manuski report: denouncing the media’s biased reports and evoking
the struggle for truth and justice
 
42 The ‘Khairlanji’ documentary movie that circulated on copied CDs in Nagpur and that was
given to me by a Buddhist shop keeper as containing the ‘truth’ about Khairlanji, provides
a good illustration of the movement’s narration of outrage. Despite the fact that it was
not made by a Buddhist but by a sympathiser of the movement who shot the film during
the  protests,  its  acceptance  as  genuine  testimony  on  the  events  and  protest  was
confirmed to me several  times by members of  the Buddhist  community.  It  is  in fact
interesting to note that even while it could be appropriated by the communal discourse
by the Buddhist community, whose narrative emphasised the communal nature of the
outrage, this outside contribution to the narrative of outrage placed the offence at a
secular, non-communal level, as an assault on Indian values. This film in fact played a
special function in certifying the outrage, by showing that not only one community had
been hurt, but that the very basic values on which the Indian nation was built had been
assaulted. This shows that the expression of communal outrage is more complex than the
‘communal’  label  can induce us to think,  since it  also relies on collective values and
idioms  shared  across  communal  boundaries.  For  example,  in  one  sequence,  the  film
passes from a gloomy military parade in New Delhi in front of monuments like Raj Bhavan
and India Gate, with a military fanfare as soundtrack, to the unearthing of the women
victims’  dead  bodies,  for  a  second  post  mortem (since  the  first  one  had  been  done
partially in order to conceal the rape). The music itself turns to a melancholic classical
piece  of  sarangi.  The  film  therefore  powerfully  (through  aesthetic  means  that  are
conducive to emotions) conveys the contrast between an image of a ‘shining India’ proud
of  its  military  power,  monumental  grandeur  and  modernity,  and  the  distressing
‘underground’  reality  of  its  interior,  represented  by  the  macabre  image  of  a  crime
concealed by the local representatives of official authorities.21
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 Manufacturing communal anger: the Buddhist networks
43 The Ambedkarite activists of Bhandara district learned about the murder through the
local press. When they realised that the report concealed a major case of atrocity, they
decided to make their own inquiry and carry on their own information campaign. They
managed to buy the pictures of the dead bodies from the local photographer who had
been hired by the police when the bodies were recovered from the canal. These images
played  a  major  part  in  the  protests  and  became  the  main  incentive  for  producing
collective anger (Figures 3 & 4). In Bhandara, Asit Bagde, an Ambedkarite activist who was
among the first to take up the issue, explained me:
We were able to use the pictures to speak about the murder (…) the same way that
the photograph affected me, I could explain it to the next brother and he could
explain to the next one; this way publicity spread orally in the first ten days. In the
first ten days, it was only oral, and it went like this: this happened and it happened
like this, and then they were murdered in this manner.22
44 The news thus spread from activist to activist, at the pace of a rumour, creating distress
and building the tension in the local Buddhist community. The matter was eventually
taken over by some Nagpur activists who came to Asit Bagde. They were government
servants, who had more means and a wide network of activists at their disposal and were
therefore better equipped to organise an agitation from the Buddhist strongholds of the
city.  ‘They  went  door  to  door  to  explain  to  people  how (the  Bhotmange)  had  been
murdered, and after that some meetings began to take place in Nagpur’,23 Bagde recalls.
45 Milind Mane, a key actor in the ensuing mobilisation, acknowledges that he came to know
about the atrocity by seeing the photographs. Along with a delegation of the Buddhist
community  from  Nagpur,  comprising  the  local  elected  member  of  the  legislative
assembly, Nitin Raut (Congress), they made a visit to Khairlanji and to Bhandara hospital,
where they met Bhayyalal, the traumatised father.
46 Milind Pakhile, a class 1 officer and social activist from the Buddhist community who was
among them, wrote to me that meeting him at the hospital ‘was a benumbing experience,
it was not rage or anger, just suddenly fridging the senses’.24 Being a government officer
(and thus forbidden by law to take part in political activities), Pakhile could not openly
participate in the agitation.25 Therefore,  it  was a local grassroots political activist,  Dr
Milind Mane (the city president of the Prakash Ambedkar faction of the RPI), who took
the lead of the Khairlanji Dalit Hatyakand Kruti Samiti (‘Khairlanji Dalit Massacre Action
Committee’, thereafter KDHKS). It was conceived as a non-political and neutral platform
disconnected from existing organisations in order to protect it from political factionalism
and organisational rivalries. In order to respond to the atrocity in a dignified manner,
social unity was the order of the day. Milind Pakhile emphasises that the committee had
been  formed  with  the  sole  purpose  of  providing  medical  support  and  legal  aid  to
Bhayyalal Bhotmange, thus shunning any link with political purposes and emphasising its
respectability. The community needed to forget its political divisions and stand up as one
publicly, so as to display publicly its unity and its ability to react vigorously to the threat.
While such unanimity was made possible thanks to the committee’s apolitical stand, it
was implicitly but conspicuously opposed to the different RPI faction leaders’ inability to
unite which in many ways was resented as having created the conditions that made the
massacre possible. It was often the different factions’ grassroots activists themselves who
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created  this  unity  between  themselves  without  any  consideration  for  their  political
bosses’ divisions, as Milind Pakhile’s role testifies.26
47 The emotional ‘outburst’ thus did not arise by itself, but was manufactured through a
multiplicity of  individual  initiatives  by  activists  and  ordinary  people  who  publicly
displayed the photos of the dead and tortured bodies of the victims in different forms.
Without obeying any specific order, these pictures were duplicated on leaflets, posters
and plastic banners by activists acting on their own, and distributed, pasted or hung in
the main Buddhist strongholds of Nagpur city and Vidarbha towns; rather than the larger
public, these images addressed the Buddhist community, whose passions were aroused in
order to propel it into action. Once given a public character, the atrocity called for a
public reaction.  Framing the atrocity as communal outrage was the most efficient of
available thematic repertoires with which to generate the desired passionate expression
of revolt.  The communal language of honour and disgrace was the most fit to arouse
passions:  a  language  shunning  compromise  that  everyone  could  articulate  and
understand,  whose  potential  for  urban  riots  played  on  deeply  entrenched  fears  and
fantasies in the Indian collective imaginary. The KDHKS issued an unsigned Hindi leaflet
titled ‘Is casteism over in India? For how long will we go on bearing these atrocities?’, and
called for a demonstration of unity on 6 November to ‘wash away the disgrace to Dalits’.27
 
Sensitizing the mainstream public: Dalit and non Dalit initiatives,
from citizen responsibility to staging anger
48 It is interesting to follow the genuine but relatively unsuccessful efforts that were made
to publicise the events in the national press by local activists sympathetic to the Dalits
but neither part of the Buddhist community or the Ambedkarite movement. The latter, a
politicised caste network of the Mahars/Buddhists, is a multifarious network of local and
regional organisations. It is thus autonomous and relatively separated from other, non-
caste based, social movements. Its main connections outside of the Mahar caste are with
the  other  regional  Dalit  based  Ambedkarite  movements.  However,  the  massacre  was
brought to public attention outside these Dalit circles and rated as a major human rights
issue thanks to the involvement of non-Dalit progressive activists like Ashu Saxena, a
Nagpur based feminist  close to the CPI(Marxist).28 Local  activists of  the Vidarbha Jan
Andolan Samiti (mobilising on the issue of indebted farmers’ suicides) also lost no time in
reacting to the first biased press reports by sending a fact finding team to Khairlanji on 6
October, writing reports, and sending them by internet to different national and regional
newspapers and organisations.  The national media,  however,  failed to respond to the
alarm raised, seemingly due to a lack of interest in what seemed to New Delhi-based
journalists the unclear goings on in remote areas considered feudal and backward. The
independent internet press such as Tehelka and DNA India gave equally late but more
sensitive  coverage  to  the  events,  while  also  lamenting  their  own late  reactions  and
blaming the more established news agencies for their indifference.29 In addition to their
urban bias, the national media’s absence of reaction can be explained by the upper caste
and class origin of journalists. It is not purely by chance that the first article to break the
silence in the mainstream national media was written in the Times of India by an American
female reporter (Sabrina Buckwalter) who happened to work for the Indian press.30 A
report by Shivam Vij, a Dalit journalist31 at Tehelka.com, drew a comparison between the
indifference to the casteist atrocity and the high degree of publicity accorded to other
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criminal issues like the Jessica Lal rape in Delhi.32 In comparison to Dalit massacres in
Bihar in the late 1990s by landlord militias or to casualties of the Naxalite conflict in the
neighbouring tribal state of Chattisgarh, the number of victims was also less impressive.
Khairlanji  might  have  appeared  less  deserving  of  national  coverage  due  the
comparatively small number of casualties.  Indeed, such massacres have become usual
features of the local news in certain states (not in Maharashtra, however, which boasts of
being exceptionally ‘liberal’), and therefore do not make headlines, unless the casualties
are exceptionally high or unless they have political consequences. When Dalit massacres
became frequent in the late 1970’s (due to the growing politicisation and assertion of
Dalit villagers), they became of some use to the central government, which attempted to
oust  their  political  rivals  in several  states through the imposition of  president’s  rule
(Brass 1998; Mendelsohn and Vicziani, 1998). The Khairlanji case obviously lacked such
political salience, insofar as the Congress was part of the government both at the centre
and  in  Maharashtra,  the  latter  thus  being  supported  by  the  former.  The  massacre
therefore did not have any ‘political value’ for the media either obsessed as it is by the
‘news value’ of events. Different opposition parties in Maharashtra did make noise on the
issue during the opening of the winter assembly session in early December with the sole
aim of destabilising the coalition government. But the Congress president, Sonia Gandhi,
gave  a  clean  chit  to  the  Maharashtra  government,  notwithstanding  the  protestors’
allegations of official complicity in concealing the massacre. Despite its support to the
central government, the CPI(M) was the only national party to support the agitation by
sending its  feminist  leader  and politburo member,  Brinda Karat,  in  Vidarbha.  On 10
November,  while  the  protests  were  reaching  their  height,  she  condemned  the
concealment of the rape by the local authorities during a press conference of the KDHKS
and  expressed  her  indignation,  thus  providing  legitimacy  to  the  issue  and  to  the
protestors’ outraged reaction, whose violent protest on Nagpur streets was at its peak.
49 The media only elevated the Khairlanji massacre to the status of an ‘event’ because of the
violent protests that rocked the state, a ‘spectacle’ of insurgency whose aim precisely
intended to prevent the banalisation (or the growing invisibility) of such massacres by
catching the media’s attention. In this regard, one may think of the community’s public
manifestation of  outrage  as  a  partly  organised and partly  spontaneous  act  of  public
communication addressed to the state and the media. It meant making sufficient noise
and  creating  enough  of  a  nuisance  that  the  administration  would  reconsider  its
indifferent attitude, and the media would start reporting Dalit atrocities as critical issues.
The Dalit activists’ ability to stage publicly such an insurgency, their communal discourse
and networks thus proved to be the more efficient to raise an alarm, compared to other
progressive networks and discourses that called on the responsibility of Indian citizens.
But it must be acknowledged that the strong presence of such progressive activists in
Vidarbha played a significant part in giving wider legitimacy to the cause.
 
The popular language of communal outrage
50 Thomas  Hansen’s  insights  regarding the issue  of  sovereignty  in  communal  discourse
(2005) provide a heuristic frame with which to analyse the popular discourse of outrage.
As  noted  by  Hansen,  by  claiming  their  autonomy,  communities  compete  with  the
overarching  public  authority  of  the  state.  The  communal  discourse  thus  claims
communities to be ‘the natural repositories of morality and ethical life in India, separated
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from, and conceptually opposed to, the state.’ (2005: 124). I would like to add that in such
rivalries with the state’s  overarching authority,  communal mobilisations’  self-claimed
opposition to the state should not be taken for granted, since they also seek to assert
their own sovereignty within the state, in competition with other communities that seek
to appropriate its power or maintain their influence from within. The present case study
clearly  illustrates  how a  powerless  community  seeks  to  contest  what  Hansen
characterises as the ‘de facto sovereign power—the right to kill, punish and discipline with
impunity’  (2005: 111).  While Dalits do not hold a position within the state that could
guarantee the application of the law that is supposed to protect them,33 their struggle is
to  ensure  the  state  functions  according  to  its  official  conception  as  a  neutral  and
benevolent  government  that  guarantees  security  and  rights  equally  to  all  citizens.
However, in addition to this public claim posed in the language of rights and justice, I
would like to show how the popular idea of communal outrage was also constructed at
another, more passionate and bodily level by the protestors. This discourse focused on
religious insult  and on the assault  of  the community’s  metaphoric body through the
women’s rape. The communal discourse is thus highly abstract in nature, to the extent
that it tends to leave the notion of ‘human rights’, in the background, as if the injustice
and suffering  met  by  these  four  particular  dalits  came second to  more  abstract  yet
passionate notions of community honour.
51 The women’s rape, which was attested by the Dalit witnesses, but contested by the two
successive post mortems (and eventually denied by the final court judgement for lack of
technical evidence),  was specifically highlighted in the discourse directed at the local
Buddhist community audience in a bid to engineer a strong emotional response to the
official neglect that was revealed by the way these post mortems were conducted. While
the  first  post  mortem  deliberately  omitted  the  rape  test  so  as  to  avoid  a  major
conflagration during the Buddhist gathering in Nagpur, the second one was conducted in
a superficial manner one week later after the exhumation of the bodies34. It concluded
that there was a lack of proof because of the putrefaction of the female victims’ vaginas.
By denying the rape, the administration tried to neutralise what could have provided
strong emotional incentive for communal riots. However, they also contributed to the
protestors’ sense of administrative injustice, thereby providing them incentives to revolt
by  invoking  ‘their  truth,’  based  on  the  Buddhist  witnesses’  testimony  (Bhayyalal
Bhotmange, his relative Siddharth Ghajbiye and his nephew, Rashtrapal).
52 The  picture  of  Priyanka’s  bruised  and  scratched  dead  body  (Figure  4)—her  genitals
covered by a scarf (placed there by someone before taking the photograph, probably in a
last and symbolic attempt to protect her modesty)—was printed among the pictures of
the other victims’ corpses on the leaflets that were distributed by the protest organisers
and the posters that were pasted in the Buddhist neighbourhoods. These images had a
particularly strong effect on the minds of Buddhists.
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Figure 4. Negative print of Priyanka’s dead body, suggesting the rape, on page 4 of the Manuski
report. The photo negative effect can be interpreted as another attempt (like the scarf that was
placed on her genitalia when the picture was taken) by the report authors, to protect her modesty,
despite the necessity to expose publicly her nudity in order to publicise the outrage.
53 Rape is a basic element in the language of communal offence as well  as a feature of
communal  violence.  It  is  meant  to  humiliate  the  community  of  the  victims  and
understood as such,  thus calling for  a  collective reaction to defend the community’s
honour. Depicted as mother and sister, the woman’s body stands as an abstraction for the
community’s  vulnerability.  This  abstraction  is  however  not  devoid  of  intimate  and
affective connotations in reference to concrete, affectionate and intimate family ties. As,
for example, with the Hindu nationalist narratives of Bharat Mata,  the goddess of the
Indian nation, a community’s honour is figured as depending on the manly protection of
the physical integrity of the female body (Assayag 2001).35
54 However, it is interesting to note that among the Buddhists of Bhandara district with
whom I spoke, the women themselves were the most vocal about the rape and proudly
highlighted their massive participation in the protests. This reaction of solidarity towards
the victims took on a language of self-defence, therefore upsetting the usual chauvinistic
vision of feminine vulnerability protected by the male. This striking redefinition of the
sexual division of communal labour has a long history in the Ambedkarite movement
(Rege 2006). It will be dealt with more at length in my forthcoming article on the post-
Khairlanji  Buddhist  protests,  where  an  imaginary  of  insurgency  and  upheaval  was
activated through images of women’s public expression of anger. 
55 There is also a second salient feature of the language of communal outrage that I would
like to highlight. My talks with Buddhist people indicated that they often defined the
outrage as an insult on ‘Babasahab’, (the popular name given to Ambedkar). The front
cover of a whole issue devoted to Khairlanji at the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the
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Buddhist  conversion in Nagpur (6  December 2006,  an event  that  was  banned by the
government due to the tension) shows how Ambedkar was literally brought into the
picture of the Khairlanji issue (Figure 5).
 
Figure 5. Cover of a Marathi publication of the Khairlanji Dalit Hatyakand Kruti Samiti, advertising a
protest on 6 December 2006, on the date of Ambedkar’s death anniversary
56 Interestingly,  Ambedkar  himself  had  not  been  insulted  in  the  Khairlanji  massacre,
whereas it has often been the case in the repeated ‘Ambedkar statue related incidents’, in
which statues are defiled and desecrated and frequently generate street violence. This
aspect of outrage as assault on a communal symbol is more congruent with the legal
definition of communal insult in India in the article n°295A of the Indian Penal Code,
established in the late 19th century by the colonial authorities and based on the outrage to
‘religious symbols’. It must be noted that the law was not a pure invention, but reflected
long existing popular practises of violent popular reactions to ritualised provocations
(Gaboriau 1985, Bayly 1986). There is, however, little doubt that the official approval of
the notion of religious outrage encouraged its popular uses for different purposes, like
strategies to retain urban land in the face of eviction threats (Jaoul 2007), thus diverting
the colonial law into what James Scott called a ‘weapon of the weak’ (1985). This explains
how religious outrage became part of a popular repertoire of communal incentives for
collective action. For Ambedkarite Dalits, it was thus convenient to turn Ambedkar into a
religious symbol.  Such a framing of the popular icon into a religious symbol became
facilitated by his role in the mass conversion to Buddhism (Jaoul 2007).
57 Notwithstanding the absence of any apparent link between the Khairlanji issue and the
honour  of  Ambedkar,  the  protestors  with  whom I  talked  emphasised  the  continuity
between their emotional involvement with the Khairlanji  atrocities and their faith in
Ambedkar’s ideals.36 Revolt was justified by them not just by the atrocity in itself but
because it meant insulting those ideals associated with their great man. An artisan in
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Nagpur explained me that Ambedkarites were so devoted to their ‘saviour’ (Ambedkar)
that they could bear starvation without complaint, but would not tolerate any insult to
him. A Buddhist  professor of  Nagpur University described poor villagers as the most
genuine  Ambedkarites  who,  despite  their  illiteracy  and  poverty,  would  purchase  a
portrait of Ambedkar to place inside their homes, even if they could not afford to buy
their next meal. Statements such as these, that proudly recounted the strength of popular
devotion,  were often repeated to me,  the main point being that dignity came before
material welfare for ‘true Ambedkarites’.  In Tumser, a student in mechanical training
claimed that if he opened his chest, Ambedkar would come out of it (he thus adapted the
popular image of Hindu god Hanuman extracting his heart from his chest as a sign of
devotion to Ram). According to such a view, Ambedkar inheres in the Dalit body. Any
insult, therefore, to an image of Ambedkar was tantamount to attacking one’s physical
integrity. But the popular perception of the Khairlanji massacre as an insult to Ambedkar
shows that the relation of condensation between the image and the Dalit body can also be
reversed: the rape and murder were depicted by the movement as an onslaught on the
whole Dalit community, and by extension as an offence to Dalit dignity that called for the
same type of violent and passionate reaction as in cases where Ambedkar statues are
insulted.37
58 A Buddhist autorickshaw driver, who took time during his working hours to take me all
over Tumser for free to meet protestors, emphasised the political relevance of the image
of Ambedkar’s presence in the Dalit heart. According to him, such intense devotion could
be turned into communal unity and psychological strength, which he seemed to value
more than economic or political power.
They (the OBCs) have strength, but we have the strength of Baba (Ambedkar), and
we are therefore not weaker than them. So we do not need any organisation. If
Babasahab is insulted, we become united; these other log (OBCs) have now realised
this.38
59 The Buddhist protestors with whom I talked also valorised their devotional commitment
and  dismissed  any  kind  of  economic  or  political  rationality  to  the  movement.  They
presented their emotional response as a sincere, immediate and spontaneous reaction of
commitment to their ‘saviour’, thus pitting the realm of emotions against the domain of
organised politics, where calculations, instrumentalism and self-interest prevailed.
60 As shown in the previous quotation, the Buddhist protestors of Vidarbha, however, did
not  rule  out  the  existence  of  another  type  of  rationale,  that  of  recreating  the
psychological unity of the Buddhist community whose political divisions at the hands of
‘selfish politicians’ they sought to overcome through emotional unity generated at the
grassroots. Raising the threshold of their communal sensitivity was therefore a central
concern whose rationale lied in the regeneration of the community, from which every
benefit would unquestionably flow. These conscious goals of the ‘outraged community’
thus  point  to  a  partly  conscious,  partly  instinctive,  form  of  ‘subaltern  politics’  of
communal outrage, that Owen Lynch’s study of the Jatav (Buddhist Dalits) riots of 1978 in
Agra also highlights.39 Likewise, Asit Bagde, the main organiser of the Bhandara protests,
said to me:
Now when the people from other communities see our reaction (to Khairlanji), how
we’ve become united, how we’ve gathered our community to protest this incident,
the thought that they’d better not create any tension comes to their mind (…). Now
before doing anything like this they will have to think ten times. A pressure group
is born.40
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61 Milind  Mane,  the  founder  of  the  KDHKS,  for  his  part  emphasised  that  lowering  the
threshold of Dalits’ communal sensitivity would act as protective ramparts: ‘High class
people understand that we’re united and fight. This gives our community protection for
coming years’.41 Considering the relevance of political support in the local setup, this
vision seems naïve and relatively mistaken. It is a desperate position that indicates the
erosion of Dalits’ trust in the Indian democracy’s ability to guarantee their interests or
even provide them basic protection in a caste-conscious society. But even if this vision
seems  naïve,  its  romanticism  and  popular  appeal  proved  efficient  in  terms  of
mobilisation.
 
Conclusion: remembering ‘Khairlanji’
62 In September 2008,  the fast  track court set up in Bhandara in order to judge the 38
accused found 8 guilty, among whom 2 were sentenced to life imprisonment and 6 to
death by hanging. Although many guilty persons have been released for lack of evidence,
such an effective sentence is quite rare in cases of atrocities, principally because the only
witnesses willing to speak out are generally Dalits, and thus considered biased (Galanter
1989). The result is clearly the outcome of the pressure put on the authorities by the post-
Khairlanji protests that stormed the state for several weeks and started mounting once
again at the end of the trial, causing apprehension among the authorities. Although the
Khairlanji  movement’s  naïve  claim  that  a  large  scale  uprising  would  make  such  an
atrocity impossible in the future is contradicted by the continuing victimisation of the
Buddhist community,42 it is possible (although difficult to prove) that the threshold of
tolerance to caste discrimination has been lowered.
63 At  a  symbolic  level,  one  of  the  movement’s  noticeable  outcomes  has  been  to  make
‘Khairlanji’  a  household  word.  The  word  has  become  a  signifier  of  continuing  caste
oppression  and  connotes  outrage.  It  also  stands  for  an  urgent  incentive  to  struggle
against continuing caste injustices as the title of an internet article by Jaideep Hardikar’s
(a freelance journalist and activist of the campaign against peasant suicides) suggests:
‘Here  every  village  is  a  Khairlanji  today’.43 Similarly,  in  order  to  explain  that  his
involvement in the movement generated professional harassment that led him to resign
from his job, Milind Pakhile,  a class 1 officer in the administration, used in an email
communication with me the word ‘Khairlanji’  as  a  metaphor of  caste discrimination:
‘Khairlanji does not happen in Khairlanji only, it happens everywhere in some form or
other. In cities it happens in a more sophisticated way, in a subtle way. I also faced it in
my office: this is what is the backdrop of the resignation’.44 Thus, the word ‘Khairlanji’ is
now being commonly used by local  activists to denounce any case of  exploitation or
discrimination against Dalits,  whether in the urban middle-class residential areas and
professional milieus, or in the villages, where the oppression of poor Dalit villagers is
much more pervasive and brutal. World history sadly abounds with words that evoke the
place of a massacre, and the memory of historical outrages against the very values of
human dignity (like Auschwitz,  Oradour sur Glane,  Timisoara,and in the Indian case,
Jhallianwallabagh or  more  recently  Laxmanpur-Bathe).  Such words,  however,  do  not
enter common parlance by virtue of the inherent nature of the outrage itself, but need to
be rendered common through a work on memory that is often emotional in nature. For a
marginal  group like Dalit  Buddhists in India,  who lack access to power and symbolic
resources, making such a word part of mainstream vocabulary is a challenge that can
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only be met through struggle. It is not just ‘symbolic’ struggle, since the latter may need
to be fought physically on the streets, as with the case of the post-Khairlanji movement.
64 This work on collective memory, however, does not stop with the movement, but can
only succeed if it is continuously reiterated through activist networks, litterature and
events.  Buddhists  have  not  spared  any  effort  in  this  direction.  Apart  from  several
pamphlets and articles in Marathi, an English book on Khairlanji has been published by
an Ambedkarite publisher (Teltumbde 2008). Internet sites have been launched, such as
‘stopatrocity’,  an  internet  site  and  telephone  service  to  help  victims  register  their
complaints. Another interesting internet site, ‘atrocitynews’, is more specifically devoted
to the memory of the Khairlanji events, the movement and judicial developments, as well
as the publicisation of other cases of caste injustice. In a brief evocation of the second
anniversary of the massacre, where a Buddhist ritual was organised by Buddhist activists
at the site of the Bhotmange house in Khairlanji, one can read: ‘Khairlanji massacre has
become a WATERSHED that sensitised media, civil society and politics by producing a
realistic perspective on caste violence very deeply’.45 Through these alternative media,
the Khairlanji massacre has thus become incorporated in a series of events and struggles
that make up the Ambedkarite movement’s rich historiography of Dalit struggles.
65 As noted by Sharmila Rege, these former events and movement have left a strong mark
on the Dalit consciousness of Maharashtra, where ‘The riots and the violence which they
displayed were also incorporated into the literature of the dalit movement and became a
symbol of the continuing Dalit passion’ (Rege 2006: 293). During my fieldwork, people
often referred to the Namantar movement as a historical precedent of the post-Khairlanji
protests The young generation, which was suspected by the elders of being less militant
than previous generations, now felt that it had left its generational imprint on history.
There was obvious pride in having confronted the authorities and become the heroic
defenders of humanistic values and democratic ideals, ideals that are routinely trashed in
the everyday lives of Dalits and other marginal groups in contemporary India.
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NOTES
1. The expression ‘righteous anger’ is taken from Gamson (1992).  I  would like to thank Rupa
Viswanathan for helping me editing this article in proper english and also for her perceptive
comments on its content, as well as Mariam Mufti for her kind help at the last moment. I also
thank Joel Cabalionfor sharing his knowledge of the Vidharba region’s social movements as well
as Owen Lynch and Alban Bensa for their insightful suggestions that helped me sharpen several
arguments. My gratitude also goes to Pr. Pralhad Jogdand, from Mumbai University for putting
me in touch with Vidarbha activists, and to Pr. Govardhan Wankhede, Tata Institute, for his kind
help  on  Marathi  translations.  I  overall  express  my  gratitude  to  the  many  people  from  the
Buddhist  community  of  Tumser,  Bhandara  and  Nagpur,  whose  wholehearted  assistance  and
support  facilitated  my  fieldwork.  Since  the  matter  remains  sensitive  in  the  region,  I  have
preferred not to name them.
2. The Mahars,  Maharashtra’s most important caste of Dalits,  who converted to Buddhism in
1956, following their leader Ambedkar’s own conversion for the sake of emancipation.
3. One could also add to these heuristic insights of the emotional work approach that by seeking
to replace submissive attitudes by assertive ones,  the theatrical  public display of anger is an
important  pedagogic  tool  that  movements  of  the  oppressed  use  in  order  to  transform  the
collective ethos of dominated and stigmatised groups. The way Dalit anger was publicly staged by
the Vidarbha Dalit protestors and the echo it found in the media will be the subject of a separate
forthcoming paper.
4. Harijan, meaning ‘people of god’,  is  the Gandhian word for ‘untouchable’.  Although it was
coined to make them more acceptable to orthodox Hindus, it was denounced by Dalit since it
carried charitable and miserabilist overtones.
5. Despite their intention to enlarge the category to include all oppressed Indians, however, the
word ‘Dalit’ has remained a synonym of ‘Untouchables’.
6. As summarized by James Scott (1990).
7. See Murugkar (1991).
8. Regarding  the  passionate  emphasis  on  the  symbolic  conquest  of  urban  space  in  the
Ambedkarite movement in Uttar Pradesh, see Jaoul (2007).
9. While Jogendra Kawade, an ex-Dalit Panther leader, had been nominated as a member of the
Legislative Council of Maharashtra (the upper house of the assembly), R.S. Gavai, from Amraoti,
had been nominated as governor in the distant state of Bihar. 
10. The Bahujan Samaj Party is a Dalit led party whose stronghold is in Uttar Pradesh. Its recent
political offensive to conquer other Indian states has been relatively encouraging in the Vidarbha
region, where it has managed to attract a good share of the tribal vote.
11. ‘Maharashtra.  Data  highlights:  the  scheduled  castes’,  Census  of  India  2001.  http://
www.censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_sc_maha.pdf
12. 48,5%  of  the  total  Mahar  population  belongs  to  the  agricultural  labourer  category  (an
exclusively  rural  category),  and 65,5% of  them are rural.  The rural  Mahars belonging to the
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agricultural labourers category can therefore be estimated by the following arithmetic operation:
48,5 X (100/65,5= 1,53)= 74,04%.
13. Indian people’s tribunal on untouchability.  Jury kit.  Case briefs vol.1;  Tehelka.  2007. ‘ This
Unending Disgrace ‘, 22 September.
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main34.asp?Filename=Ne220907THISUNENDING.asp
14. Hitavada (Nagpur). 2006. ‘Four of a family done to death by villagers’, 3 October.
http://news.hitavadaonline.com/news/index.php?Mode=single&page=13&n=10426
15. Bensa (2008: 323). My translation from French. 
16. This position does not take into account Weber’s more subtle approach to emotion as an
integral part of the academic ethos, which values intellectual passion.
17. My translation from the French edition.
18. My translation from French.
19. My translation from French.
20. ‘Caste  Atrocity  in  Khairlanji.  Buddhists  killed  and  raped  by  caste  Hindus’.  http://
www.manuski.net/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/khairlanji.pdf
21. Patil, Pratap. ‘Khairlanji’, documentary movie. Vivid Vision Production, 43 minutes. Timing of
the sequence: 0:08:07 to 0:08:42.
22. Translated from Hindi.
23. Translated from Hindi.
24. Personal email communication, August 2008.
25. He would eventually pay for his role in the protests, by being forced to resign from his job
because of the professional pressures from above he had to go through as a punishment.
26. This making of grassroots unity by the second rung local leadership of the RPI factions has
also been noted by Teltumbde (2007).
27. ‘Kya Bharat mein Jativad Khetm hua?’ (undated leaflet, translated from Hindi).
28. Frontline. 2006. ‘Enforcing silence’, 2 December. 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2324/stories/20061215002809800.htm.
29. Sankarshan Thakur (2006), ‘Editorial’, Tehelka, 11 November.
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main22.asp?filename=op111106The_tehelka_view.asp.
30. Times of India (New Delhi). 2006. ‘Just another rape story’, 29 October.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-222682,flstry-1.cms.
31. There  are  very  few  Dalit  journalists  in  the  Indian  mainstream  English-language  media,
although there has been a recent tendency to give Dalit intellectuals weekly columns as Dalit
editorialists expressing ‘Dalit opinions’.
32. Tehelka. 2006. ‘India outraged. Dalits, like fleas to feudal lords’,11 November 2006.
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main22.asp?filename=Ne111106Dalits_like.asp.
33. Except in Uttar Pradesh, where the BSP governments have posted Dalit administrators in key
positions and thereby considerably improved the Dalits’ relationship to the local administrations
(for further details on this transformation, see Jaoul 2007-b).
34. ‘Organised killings of Dalits in Khairlanji Village, Tal. Mohadi, Dist. Bhandara. A Report Under
SC-ST (PoA) Act, 1989 by Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Research & Training Institute, Department of
Social  Justice,  Government  of  Maharashtra  &  Centre  for  Equity  &  Social  Justice,  YASHADA,
Commissioned  by  Nodal  Officer,  SC-ST  (PoA)  Act,  1989,  November,  2006’. http://
atrocitynews.wordpress.com/manuski-centre-khairlanje-report/
35. It must be noted that even if prominent in the Dalit mobilisation, the rape issue also did
much to mobilise the Indian feminist leader of the CPI(M), Brinda Karat (leader of the All India
Progressive Women’s Association).
36. Eleanor Zelliot has noted that Ambedkar represented ‘a belief that somehow or someday the
Government  of  India,  the  democracy  in  which  Ambedkar  never  lost  faith,  will  protect  their
rights’ (Zelliot 2001).
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37. It is by the way striking that it was only once the protests were over in Vidarbha that the rest
of the Maharashtrian Buddhist community started rioting to protest the Khairlanji issue, and
that too in reaction to the insult to an Ambedkar statue in the distant city of Kanpur, in Uttar
Pradesh.
38. Translated from Hindi.
39. Owen  Lynch  highlighted  the  stakes  behind  the  violent  protests  by  the  Buddhist  Dalit
community of Agra (Uttar Pradesh), where after the attack of their yearly Ambedkar procession,
Dalits confronted the police and 9 of them lost their lives. ‘Upper castes felt that Jatavs needed to
be taught a lesson and put in place. Jatavs felt dishonoured and in danger of losing their rights,
because in such a situation when untouchables back down they accept not merely defeat but also
oppression and disenfranchisement’ (Lynch 1981: 1955).
40. Translated from Hindi.
41. Translated from Hindi.
42. Since Khairlanji, new cases of atrocities against tribals and Dalits have taken place in the
Vidarbha and Marathwada regions of Maharashtra.
43. Jaideep Hardikar (2007) ‘Here, every village is a 'khairlanji' today’, 
http://www.beyondmargins.blogspot.com/saturday,friday, September 28, 2007.
44. Personal email communication, August 2008.
45. ‘Today : Khairlanji Second Anniversary, 11a.m. 29 September 2008.’
http://atrocitynews.wordpress.com/
ABSTRACTS
This contribution brings to our attention a Dalit (‘untouchable’) protest movement against caste
violence (the 2006 Khairlanji massacre).  Although anger is supposedly an emotion used in an
open and demonstrative manner by the powerful as a means to enact their domination, the Dalit
movement engaged in acts of ‘emotion work’ that upset such a social mapping of emotions. The
paper  engages  critically  with  the  sterile  and  biased  concept  of  ‘axiological  neutrality’  and
advocates instead the heuristic possibilities enabled by the ethnographers’ personal exposure to
the emotion work performed by social movements. The protest’s ideological stance illustrates
the  politically  marginalised  Dalits’  appropriation  of  democratic  conceptions  through  the
language  of  injustice  and  outrage.  Two  different  sets  of  actors  involved  in  the  protest  are
distinguished: human rights and progressive activists of the peasant NGO movement on the one
hand, and the local anti-caste movement of Dalits on the other. The distinct kinds of emotion
work each set of  actors performed, and the framing of the massacre as an outrage to moral
values, highlights how, in the mobilisation for Dalit rights, the popular language of communal
outrage and the language of democratic rights articulate with and support one another.
INDEX
Keywords: Khairlanji massacre (2006), Ambedkar, axiological neutrality, caste violence,
constitutional values, Dalit assertion, Dalit movement, emotion work, ethnographer’s emotions,
moral economy, powerlessness
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